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This paper analyzes productivity with a directional distance function model by
investigating convexity and non-convexity in the Chinese banking sector. Two
primary findings are summarized. First, there is a distinct change in productivity
between large versus small banks and public versus nationwide joint-stock banks;
the economies of scale and public orientation of the Chinese economy affect the
performance of nationwide joint-stock banks. Second, the number of banks that
experience local versus global technological change is small, indicating that
productivity changes are driven by national rather than regional dynamics, although
minor regional dynamics exist in the data.
Keywords: Productivity change; Ownership; Scale; Directional distance function;
Chinese banking firms
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The People’s Bank of China (PBC), now the Central Bank of China, was established in
1948 and functioned as a central bank as well as a commercial bank; in other words, it
can be characterized as a monobank (García-Herrero et al., 2006). During the period
from 1979 to 1984, central authorities decided to reestablish (or establish) four special-
ized banks (SBs), i.e., the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), the Bank of China (BOC),
the China Construction Bank (CCB), and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of
China (ICBC). All of the aforementioned banks were separated from the PBC (except
for the CCB from the Ministry of Finance) and operated in the agricultural area,
foreign exchange area, fixed-asset investment area, and industrial and commercial
areas, respectively. However, they were not entirely profit oriented and had to conduct
policy-related business while being hampered by government intervention. As a result,
nonperforming loans arose and accumulated in the following years.
When favorable market economy reforms became more widespread, the government
began to take comprehensive measures to improve China’s banking system. In 1994,
the government founded three policy banks to take over the policy-related business
from the four SBs to transform the latter into commercial banks, which are character-
ized by market-functioning and profitable institutions (García-Herrero et al., 2009).2015 Barros et al. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
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equity commercial banks, including national joint-equity commercial banks and re-
gional commercial banks, to decrease the monopoly power of the four wholly
state-owned banks (WSOBs) in the financial market. The four WSOBs were casti-
gated by the outside world for their high nonperforming loan ratios and their tech-
nical bankruptcies after the Asian financial crisis (Whalley, 2003). Therefore, the
Chinese government instituted a package of measures to address the threatening
situation, including issuing 270 billion Yuan, drastically reducing top-heavy employ-
ment and closing branches, reducing the tax burden, and establishing four asset
management companies (AMCs) to remove a large sum of bad loans from the four
WSOBs (Bonin and Huang, 2001).
When China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, there were
new challenges brought to the financial sector before they would fully open up to
the world 5 years later. Considering the loss of market shares and even bank-
ruptcy, the government favored enhancing the efficiency and competitiveness of
domestic commercial banks, particularly the four state-owned banks (SOBs). It
launched a series of reforms to improve the banking industry so that it could
compete with foreign counterparts. First, a special banking supervisory organiza-
tion—the Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC)—was established in
2003. Second, the government utilized the exchange rate reserve to replenish the
capital funds of Chinese commercial banks through a sovereign wealth fund com-
pany, i.e., the Central Huijin Company. Third, the government transformed the
four SOBs into joint-stock commercial banks and listed them on the stock ex-
change so that they would be supervised by market forces. Table 1 shows the 14
key commercial banks in China.Table 1 The 14 key commercial banks in China
Category Name of banks Year established Year listed
State-owned commercial banks Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) 1951 2010
Bank of China (BOC) 1905 2006
China Construction Bank (CCB) 1954 2005
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) 1984 2006
Nationwide joint-stock
commercial banks
Bank of Communication (BC) 1908 2005
China Merchants Bank (CMB) 1987 2002
China Minsheng Banking Corporation (MSB) 1996 2000
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank (SPD) 1993 1999
China CITIC Bank (CITIC) 1987 2007
China Everbright Bank (CEB) 1992 2010
Hua Xia Bank (HXB) 1992 2003
Industrial Bank (IB) 1988 2007
Shenzhen Development Bank (SZD) 1987 1991
Guangdong Development Bank (GDD) 1988 Not listed
Sources: the banks’ financial reports (1993–2011); the Almanac of Chinese Finance and Banking (1994–2011); the China
Banking Regulatory Commission’s website (http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/english/index.html)
The nationwide joint-stock banks are not private banks. Instead, their shareholders are different companies (most
are still state-owned companies) rather than the central government and can conduct business across the
entire country
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Most previous research on Chinese banks has focused on the efficiency differences
between the four large banks and other banks, comparing the effects of bank scale and
ownership. Chen et al. (2005) compared the cost efficiencies of the four largest banks
and two smaller size classes for the 1993–2000 period, concluding that the big four and
smaller joint-equity banks are all cost efficient relative to medium-sized joint-equity
banks. Furthermore, financial deregulation in the mid-1990s had a significant effect on
efficiency.
Kumbhakar and Wang (2005) utilized an input distance function and concluded that
the four large banks were less efficient than the joint-equity banks for the 1993–2002
period. Moreover, deregulation had no significant effect on efficiency improvement. Fu
and Heffernan (2007, 2009) validated the results of Kumbhakar and Wang (2005) with
a cost frontier model for the 1985–2002 period, finding that the X-efficiency of Chinese
banks significantly declined; they concluded that the reforms had little impact on the
structure of China’s banking sector. Lin and Zhang (2009) used regression models to
analyze the performance of Chinese banks from 1997 to 2004, concluding that the four
large state banks were less profitable, less efficient, and displayed worse asset quality
than other types of banks. Berger et al. (2009) analyzed the profit efficiency of Chinese
banks from 1994 to 2003 and concluded that the four large state banks were the least
efficient and that foreign banks were the most efficient; they also discovered that
minority foreign ownership was associated with significantly improved efficiency.
Several studies have utilized parametric estimations to clarify the factors affecting
efficiency. Ariff and Can (2008) analyzed the cost and profit efficiencies of 29 Chinese
commercial banks from 1995 to 2004 with a two-stage data envelopment analysis
(DEA) model, using a Tobit model in the second stage, and concluded that profit
efficiency levels were well below cost efficiency and that the inefficiencies were related
to revenue. Furthermore, state-owned banks were less efficient, as joint-stock banks
and medium-sized banks were significantly more efficient than small and large banks.
Jia (2009) analyzed the relationship between bank ownership and performance with
regression models, concluding that lending by state-owned banks has been less prudent
than lending by joint-equity banks. Jiang et al. (2009) analyzed the technical efficiency
of Chinese banks from 1995 to 2005 with a stochastic distance function and
concluded that bank efficiency and profitability improved with joint-stock owner-
ship versus state ownership. These results demonstrate that state-owned banks are
less efficient than joint-stock or foreign banks, though more recent results do show
improvement in the former.
There are many existing studies that apply DEA. Laurenceson and Yong (2008)
analyzed the efficiency of the 11 most prominent banks 5 years after China’s entry into
the WTO with a DEA for 2005, 2006, and 2007, concluding that the differences
between levels were insignificant. Barros et al. (2011) analyzed Chinese bank efficiency
with a B-convex DEA model and concluded that economies of scale were not translat-
ing into efficiency, though efficiency did increase during the study period. Avkiran and
Morita (2010) analyzed Chinese banks with a nonradial DEA model that demonstrated
that different inputs and outputs could capture five key stakeholder perspectives. They
concluded that profits relative to total assets and return on equity presented a high
correlation with efficiency.
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change using both convexity and nonconvexity production frontier line of the Chinese
banking sector. Our objective is to clarify the differences of the results between convex
and nonconvex assumptions in the Chinese banking sector. This study is the first to
focus on determining the existence of (non)convexity in banking sector production.
This paper analyzes the efficiency in Chinese banks from 1993 to 2010, focusing on
both convex production technology (CPT) and nonconvex production technology
(NCPT) in the Chinese banking sector. Although research on banking efficiency is a
well-established field as we explain above, research on Chinese banks focusing on the
NCPT is more limited. In this context, the relationship between production techno-
logical change and firm characteristics (e.g., firm scale and ownership) is questionable.
This research is motivated by the following criteria. First, there is a systematic
conclusion that Chinese banks are inefficient based on various alternative methodolo-
gies of efficiency research (Berger et al., 2009). Reasons for this systematic result vary,
but they are typically attributed to bank management procedures in which the govern-
ment and Communist Party are closely entwined with the bank managers. While this
situation may appeal to state planners, it is inefficient for individual banks (Economist,
2010) and justifies further analyses of Chinese bank productivity to discern undetected
aspects of Chinese banking activity. Second, China has three of the four largest banks
in the world today based on market capitalization (Economist, 2010), signifying the
global importance of Chinese banks and justifying the present research. Third,
efficiency and productivity are two separate aspects of overall performance, and to date,
the analysis of Chinese banks has focused on efficiency. Therefore, this paper proposes
an innovative approach in this context and presents an updated and clearer view of the
extent of Chinese bank productivity, complementing research in this field and identify-
ing local and global technological changes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The “Methods” section details
the methodology. Then, the “Data and results” section presents the data and discusses
the results, and the “Conclusions” offers conclusions.3 Methods
3.1 Directional distance function
We apply a directional distance function (DDF) approach to evaluate the productive
inefficiency of the Chinese banking sector. One advantage point of DDF is that
productive inefficiency can be evaluated using multiple input and output variables.
There is a growing literature of productivity analysis studies using DDF (Fujii et al.,
2010; Tanaka and Managi, 2013; Fujii et al., 2014; Kumar et al., 2015).
Let x∈ℜLþ; y∈ℜ
M
þ be vectors of inputs and outputs, respectively, and then define the
production technology as follows:
P xð Þ ¼ x; yð Þ : x can produce yð Þf g ð1Þ
Productive inefficiency score D(x, y| gx, gy) of production units in P(x) for each firmin this study is defined with the distance β from the production frontier consisting of
efficient production units as follows:
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where gx and gy denote nonnegative directional vectors of the input and outputs,
respectively. From the above definition, Eq. (2) can be computed for province k by
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k þ βCPTk gym ð5Þ
XN
i¼1
λi ¼ 1 ð6Þ
λi ≥ 0 i ¼ 1;⋯;Nð Þ ð7Þ
where l and m represent the name of the input and desirable output, respectively. x is
an input matrix with dimensions L ×N and y is a desirable-output matrix with dimen-
sions M ×N. Furthermore, gx is the directional vector of the input matrix, gy is the
directional vector of the desirable-output matrix, βk is the inefficiency score of the firm
k, and λi is the weight variable. To estimate the inefficiency score of all firms, the model
needs to be applied independently to each of the N firms. The right-hand side of Eqs.
(4) and (5) represents the frontier line, and λi is the parameter to decide the reference
point. The directional vector specifies for inefficient firms the way to improve product-
ivity towards the frontier production line. Equation (6) sets that production function is
under the various return to scale assumptions.1
In a similar manner, our NCPT formulation calculates the distance function by solv-
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k þ βNCPTk gym ð10Þ
XN
i¼1
λi ¼ 1 ð11Þ
λi∈ 0; 1f g ∀i ð12Þ1Studies that employ the distance function model typically assume either constant returns to scale (CRS) or
variable returns to scale (VRS). In this study, we assumed VRS to capture the firm scale effect.
Fig. 1 Production frontier line under nonconvex and convex technologies. Source: Kerstens and Managi (2012)
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In the DDF model under the NCPT assumption is added Eq. (12) in the DDF model
under the CPT assumption. Equation (12) has the role of the integrality constraint. By
setting Eq. (12), we can assume a nonconvexity production frontier line (Kerstens and
Managi (2012)). Figure 1 represents the production frontier line shape under two
assumptions which are a nonconvex and convex technology.
3.2 Luenberger productivity indicator and structure of technical change
The total factor productivity (TFP) was computed with the results of the distance
function model and is derived as follows (Chambers et al., 1998):




fD→ tþ1 xt ; ytð Þ þ D
→ tþ1 xtþ1; ytþ1
 
−D
→ t xt ; ytð Þ− D
→ t xtþ1; ytþ1
 g ð15Þ
EFFCHtþ1t ¼ D
→ t xt ; ytð Þ−D
→ tþ1 xtþ1; ytþ1
  ð16Þ
where xt represents the input for year t; xt + 1 is the input for year t + 1; yt is the desir-
able output for year t; and yt + 1 is the desirable output for year t + 1. D
→
t xt ; ytð Þ is the
inefficiency score of year t based on the frontier curve in year t. Similarly, D
→
tþ1 xt ; ytð Þ
is the inefficiency of year t + 1 based on the frontier curve in year t + 1.
The TFP score indicates the productivity change compared to the benchmark year.
We estimate two types of TFP indicator. One is TFPCPT which is estimated under CPT
assumption and the other one is TFPNCPT which is estimated under NCPT assumption.
The TFP includes all categories of productivity change, delineated as technical change
Fig. 2 Global technical change (GTC) and local technical change (LTC). Source: Kerstens and Managi (2012)
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tion frontier, and EFFCH measures the change in a production unit’s position relative
to the frontier (i.e., catching up).
Kerstens and Managi (2012) developed an identification methodology for global
technological change (GTC) and local technological change (LTC) through productivity
indicators using both TFP results estimated under CPT and NCPT assumptions.
Figure 2 shows the graphical image of GTC and LTC. The performances of six firms in
the t year and t + 1 year are found in Fig. 2. Here, we consider two cases. The first case
is that all six firms shift to the upper left direction which shows a more efficient
production (less input, more output). This frontier line shift represents the global
technical change. The second case is that only firm D shifts to the upper left direction
in the t + 1 year, and the other firms stay at the same point in the t year. In this case,
the frontier line shape is changed partially from the t year to t + 1 year. This partial
frontier line shift is called the local technical change (Fujii et al., 2015).
If we define global technical progress as resulting from efficient observations at two
time periods that experience positive TECHCH under CPT assumption (TECHCHCPT)
between the periods t and t + 1 relative to CPT, then:
GTC xt; ytð Þ xtþ1; ytþ1
   ¼ DtCPT xt ; ytð Þ¼0 ∩Dtþ1CPT xtþ1; ytþ1
  ¼ 0 ∩TECHCHt;tþ1CPT > 0
 
ð17Þ
whereby the arguments of the proportional distance function are suppressed to
condense notation. First condition shows bank is evaluated as efficient under CPT as-
sumption in t year. Second condition represents bank is evaluated as efficient under
CPT assumption in t+1 year. Third condition means TECHCH indicator estimated
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more efficient direction from t year to t+1 year. GTC is achieved if above three condi-
tions are satisfied simultaneously. In contrast, if we define the local technical progress
as resulting from efficient observations at two time periods in terms of NCPT while be-
ing inefficient with respect to CPT that experiences positive TECHCH under NCPT as-
sumption (TECHCHNCPT) in terms of NCPT between the two time periods, then:
LTC xt ; ytð Þ xtþ1; ytþ1
   ¼
DtNCPT xt ; ytð Þ ¼ 0∩DtCPT xt ; ytð Þ > 0
 	
∩ Dtþ1NCPT xtþ1; ytþ1










The condition of LTC in Eq. (18) is more relax than condition of GTC in Eq. (17)(Fujii et al., 2015). It should be noted that there is no case to be identified as both GTC
and LTC simultaneously. In Fig. 1, firms B, D, and F satisfy Eq. (17) and firms C and E
satisfy Eq. (18). Thus, firms B, D, and F are observed as GTC, and firms C and E are
observed as LTC from t year to t + 1 year. Firm A does not achieve both GTC and LTC
because TECHCH = 0 under the CP and NCP model (see Fig. 1).
4 Data and results
4.1 Data
We utilize data from 14 Chinese banking firms from 1993 to 2010. The financial state-
ments of the Chinese banks were sourced from their websites (1998–2008) and the
Almanac of Chinese Finance and Banking (2000–2011). Table 2 provides a description
of the data samples. All financial data were deflated to 2005 prices. Banks are assumedTable 2 Data description from 1993 to 2010 (average score per bank)
Year Employees Deposits Loans Securities
1993 115,123 1959 2140 151
1994 119,919 2767 2530 275
1995 125,337 3296 3029 315
1996 126,283 4246 3733 407
1997 125,199 4931 4179 397
1998 125,192 5740 4890 751
1999 121,111 6433 5241 1136
2000 114,024 7385 5354 1848
2001 112,242 8231 5991 2088
2002 118,798 9801 7051 2606
2003 110,689 11,535 8575 2951
2004 101,642 13,351 9444 3747
2005 108,636 13,902 9882 5402
2006 107,702 16,410 11,210 6624
2007 111,779 19,872 12,812 7814
2008 115,918 23,837 14,219 9094
2009 118,471 30,041 17,998 10,799
2010 127,365 35,231 20,851 11,630
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while utilizing two inputs, number of employees (persons) and deposits (100 million
Yuan). The Humphrey (1985) intermediation approach was adopted, which views banks
as collecting deposits that are then “intermediated” into loans and securities. Berger
and Humphrey (1997) suggested that the intermediation approach is best suited for
analyzing bank-level efficiency.
To further analyze the results, we separated the firms by company scale and owner-
ship. First, we divided the sample into two groups based on the number of employees:
large and small. Companies with more than 10,000 employees were categorized as
large, while firms with less than 10,000 employees were considered small. Based on this
criterion, there were eight large firms (ABC, BC, BOC, CCB, CITIC, CMB, GDD, and
ICBC) and six small firms (CEB, HX, IB, MSB, SPD, and SZD). Second, we divided the
sample into state-owned commercial banks and nationwide joint-stock commercial
banks to delineate ownership characteristics. Using the banks listed in Table 1, there
were 4 state-owned bank firms and 10 nationwide banks.4.2 Results and discussion
Figures 3 and 4 display the TFP change of each scale and ownership groups from 1993
to 2010 by graphically comparing the nonconvex and convex results. In calcula-
tion of the productive inefficiency score using DDF, we set the directional vector
as (gy, gx) = (y, −x). This type of directional vector assumes that an inefficient firm
can improve productivity while increasing desirable outputs and decreasing inputs
in proportion to the initial combination of actual inputs and outputs.
Figure 3 verifies that the TFP of both state-owned banks and large banks increased
during the period, while it decreased for nationwide and small banks. This observationFig. 3 Productivity change by ownership and scale by the CPT model
Fig. 4 Productivity change by ownership and scale by the NCPT model
Barros et al. Journal of Economic Structures  (2015) 4:16 Page 10 of 14is a previously recognized result in the literature, where scale is of paramount import-
ance (Berger and Mester, 1997). In fact, small banks do not typically have national
coverage and therefore are not used by the central bank to distribute the monetary
base. Though this activity is traditionally a starting point in commercial banking, the
small banks are effectively banned from it. The negative evolution of nationwide
joint-stock banks is smaller and may have been due to the public orientation of
the Chinese economy during this period that favored national public and large
banks over regional banks.
Figure 4 shows that the TFP evolves as in Fig. 3 but with minor changes. Based on
this result, it is verified that the CPT and NCPT models display a similar visual evolu-
tion. However, the CPT model highlights the changes in the series, presenting more
decreases or increases than the nonconvex model.
From Figs. 3 and 4, we guess there is significantly different TFP change by scale and
ownership. To confirm the differences of the TFP change by scale and ownership, this
study used nonparametric methods to obtain the TFP indices. Thus, we were not able
to determine the distribution of scores in advance; therefore, we needed to apply the
nonparametric test for equality densities introduced by Li et al. (2009). This
nonparametric equality test is well suited to analyze the difference of distribution
when analyzing TFP scores. This equality testing employs bootstrap resampling to
obtain the finite-sample distribution of the statistics. In this paper, we set the
bootstrap algorithm to be repeated 1000 times.
Table 3 presents the results of the nonparametric test of small versus large banks and
state-owned versus nationwide banks. Based on Table 3, the TFPCPT and TECHCHCPT
are statistically significant at a 5 % level in separating small from large banks, but the
inefficiency scores and EFFCHCPT are not. Thus, we can say the trends of TFPCPT and
TECHCHCPT are significantly different between large-scale firms and small-scale firms.
Table 3 Mean value and nonparametric test of productivity indicator by scale and owner
All Large Small p value State-owned Nationwide p value
Convex estimation
model
Inefficiency score 0.019 0.020 0.017 0.133 0.010 0.022 0.006
TFPCPT 0.004 0.038 −0.042 0.026 0.042 −0.011 0.336
TECHCHCPT 0.001 0.037 −0.046 0.037 0.042 −0.015 0.461
EFFCHCPT 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.237 0.000 0.003 0.018
Nonconvex
\estimation model
Inefficiency score 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.725 0.002 0.000 0.637
TFPNCPT −0.002 0.021 −0.033 0.055 0.014 −0.009 0.153
TECHCHNCPT −0.002 0.021 −0.033 0.052 0.014 −0.009 0.145
EFFCHNCPT −0.000 0.000 −0.000 0.718 0.000 −0.000 0.607
p value is estimated by the kernel-consistent density equality test developed by Li et al. (2009)
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Chinese banking firms through production frontier shift effect. In other words, large-
scale banking firms tended to achieve financial performance improvement with innova-
tive activities from 1993 to 2010.
Meanwhile, inefficiency score and EFFCHCPT are statistically significant between a
state-owned firm and nationwide firm. The EFFCH indicator represents how much an
inefficient firm catches up with efficient firms. Thus, we consider that a nationwide
firm tended to achieve increased financial performance by steady efforts.
Next, we discuss the results under NCPT in Table 3. The difference of TFPNCPT and
TECHCHNCPT between small versus big banks is statistically significant at a 10 % level,
which is a similar trend with the results under the CPT assumption. Meanwhile, the
difference between state-owned versus nationwide joint-stock banks is not significant
in all indicators. These results imply that the differences of ownership do not have a
strong effect into the financial performance indicator if we assume nonconvexity.
Finally, Table 4 presents the number of firms identified as GTC and LTC from 1993
to 2010 (17 periods). From Table 4, the total number of GTC is 72 which is higher than
the total number of LTC. This observation signifies that GTC is more common in
China, implying that because Chinese banks are centrally regulated, they behave
globally. Next, we discuss the differences of results focusing on each scale and owner-
ship group. Before we compare the results of each group, we need to adjust the effect
of sample size differences among groups. Because the GTC and LTC indicator is a
count data, a large sample group tends to observe the many times of GTC and LTC.
To adjust the number of firm sample differences among groups, we use the share of
GTC and LTC identification.
From Table 4, the share of GTC is more than double in large-scale firms and state-
owned firms than small and nationwide firms. This result shows that innovative finan-
cial performance improvement in the Chinese banking sector is mainly by large or
state-owned bank from 1993 to 2010. Meanwhile, the share of LTC is almost the same
between a state-owned firm and nationwide firm, even though the large-scale-firm
group has a double score of share comparing with the small-scale-firm group. This
result implies that LTC is the more popular financial performance improvement in
nationwide banking firms in China. This is another evidence to consider that nation-
wide banks improve their financial performance due to steady effort.
Table 4 Number of observed GTC and LTC
Global technology change (GTC) Local technology change (LTC)
Period All Large Small State-owned Nationwide All Large Small State-owned Nationwide
1993–1994 3 3 0 2 1 2 2 0 1 1
1994–1995 2 2 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
1995–1996 4 4 0 2 2 2 2 0 1 1
1996–1997 4 3 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0
1997–1998 4 3 1 3 1 4 3 1 1 3
1998–1999 5 3 2 2 3 4 1 3 1 3
1999–2000 6 4 2 3 3 2 1 1 1 1
2000–2001 6 4 2 2 4 5 4 1 2 3
2001–2002 5 3 2 2 3 5 4 1 1 4
2002–2003 6 4 2 3 3 2 2 0 0 2
2003–2004 3 2 1 2 1 4 3 1 1 3
2004–2005 2 2 0 2 0 5 4 1 3 2
2005–2006 2 2 0 1 1 2 2 0 0 2
2006–2007 6 4 2 1 5 4 3 1 0 4
2007–2008 4 2 2 1 3 2 1 1 0 2
2008–2009 6 4 2 3 3 2 0 2 0 2
2009–2010 4 3 1 2 2 3 3 0 2 1
1993–2010 72 52 20 34 38 49 36 13 15 34
Share (%) 30 38 20 50 22 21 26 13 22 20
The score of “Share” is calculated by number of identified firms as GTC or LTC divided by each scale and ownership
groups’ total number of firms multiplied by 17. This is because the numerator is defined as how many times a firm is
identified as GTC or LTC in the 17 periods. Thus, the denominator of the number is different between the scale
and ownership
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This paper analyzes the productive inefficiency and total factor productivity in Chinese
banks from 1993 to 2010, focusing on both convex production technology (CPT) and
nonconvex production technology (NCPT) in the Chinese banking sector. By applying
both CPT and NCPT assumption, we identified the global technical change (GTC) and
local technical change (LTC).
The conclusions of the present research are as follows. First, productivity changes are
distinct between large versus small banks and public versus nationwide joint-stock
banks, meaning that economies of scale and the public orientation of the Chinese econ-
omy affect the performance of the nationwide joint-stock banks. Second, the number of
banks that experience LTC versus GTC is small, signifying that productivity changes
are driven by national and not regional dynamics, although there are some minor
regional dynamics in the data.
What are the policy implications of this paper? Chinese bank performance should be
continually monitored using alternative methods that can shed light on unknown
research aspects of banking activity. Benchmarking enables the banks to follow the
performing leaders and therefore upgrade their activity, becoming more competitive
each year. Recognizing the both convexity and nonconvexity of the data is of
paramount importance in reaching meaningful conclusions.
How does this paper compare with previously published works on Chinese banks? By
utilizing an alternative DEA model, this paper distinguishes between GTC and LTC,
Barros et al. Journal of Economic Structures  (2015) 4:16 Page 13 of 14introducing a new view of Chinese bank efficiency. Avkiran (2011), who used a slack-
based DEA, and Matthews (2013), who presents a Chinese bank risk analysis with a
network DEA, are both convex models, so no clear comparison can be made with the
present research. More research is required to confirm the presented results.
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